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Floodlight quantum key distribution (FL-QKD) is a radically different QKD paradigm that can achieve
gigabit-per-second secret-key rates over metropolitan area distances without multiplexing [Q. Zhuang et al.,
Phys. Rev. A 94, 012322 (2016)]. It is a two-way protocol that transmits many photons per bit duration and
employs a high-gain optical amplifier, neither of which can be utilized by existing QKD protocols, to mitigate
channel loss. FL-QKD uses an optical bandwidth that is substantially larger than the modulation rate and performs
decoding with a unique broadband homodyne receiver. Essential to FL-QKD is Alice’s injection of photons from
a photon-pair source—in addition to the light used for key generation—into the light she sends to Bob. This
injection enables Alice and Bob to quantify Eve’s intrusion and thus secure FL-QKD against collective attacks.
Our proof-of-concept experiment included 10 dB propagation loss—equivalent to 50 km of low-loss fiber—and
achieved a 55 Mbit/s secret-key rate (SKR) for a 100 Mbit/s modulation rate, as compared to the state-of-the-art
system’s 1 Mbit/s SKR for a 1 Gbit/s modulation rate [M. Lucamarini et al., Opt. Express 21, 24550 (2013)],
representing ∼500-fold and ∼50-fold improvements in secret-key efficiency (bits per channel use) and SKR (bits
per second), respectively.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.95.012332
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–7] enables two re-
mote users (Alice and Bob) to create a shared secret key
with unconditional security. Using that key as a one-time
pad, they can then communicate with information-theoretic
security. Unfortunately, propagation loss incurred in long-
distance transmission has kept the secret-key rates (SKRs)
of state-of-the-art QKD systems far below the gigabit-per-
second rates needed for their widespread deployment. The
universal upper limit on a QKD system’s secret-key rate
[8–10] is − log2(1 − κ) bits per optical mode [9], where
κ is the channel transmissivity. A 50-km low-loss fiber
has κ = 0.1, implying a 0.15 bit-per-mode rate limit. The
implication of this limit for single-wavelength QKD operation
(no wavelength-division multiplexing) with existing protocols
is profound. Continuous-variable QKD protocols necessarily
operate with one optical mode per channel use [6,11,12],
because they require shot-noise limited coherent detection
with maximum mixing efficiency, while decoy-state BB84
(the predominant discrete-variable QKD protocol) takes no
advantage of multiple modes per channel use [4,5,7,13–16].
Hence − log2(1 − κ) is their ultimate secret-key efficiency
(SKE) in bits per channel use. High-dimensional QKD systems
employ multiple modes per channel use [17–23], but their
secret-key rates do not exceed that of ideal decoy-state BB84.
State-of-the-art QKD implementations, however, have SKEs
well below this limit; e.g., the 1 Mbit/s, 50-km-fiber demon-
stration from Refs. [4,5] realized 1×10−3 bits per channel use.
Given current bandwidth limitations on electronics, such low
SKEs preclude existing QKD protocols from attaining gigabit-
per-second SKRs over metropolitan-area distances unless
*zszhang@mit.edu
massive amounts of wavelength-division multiplexing—with
their attendant complexity and cost—are employed.
In this paper we experimentally validate a QKD framework,
called floodlight QKD (FL-QKD) [24], that is capable of
gigabit-per-second SKRs over metropolitan-area distances.
FL-QKD transmits many photons per bit duration and uses a
high-gain optical amplifier, neither of which can be utilized by
existing QKD protocols, to mitigate channel loss. Transmitting
many photons per bit duration without compromising security
is possible because FL-QKD utilizes an optical bandwidth that
is much greater than its modulation rate; i.e., it employs, to
great advantage, many modes per channel use. Furthermore,
FL-QKD employs a unique broadband homodyne receiver
that effectively leverages a huge optical bandwidth without
resorting to multiplexing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we summarize the FL-QKD protocol, and in Sec. III
we describe our experiment and its results. In Sec. IV we
report the calculated SKRs implied by our measurements,
and in Sec. V we present some concluding discussion.
Appendixes A–C provide supporting materials about the
experiment, our security analysis, and the SKRs at different
channel-monitoring confidence levels.
II. THE FL-QKD PROTOCOL
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of FL-QKD. FL-QKD is a
two-way multimode protocol in which, unlike previous two-
way protocols [25–31], Alice uses an amplified spontaneous
emission (ASE) source whose optical bandwidth W is much
greater than the modulation rate R. Thus in one channel
use (one T = 1/R bit duration) Alice’s ASE source emits
M = WT  1 temporal modes of duration 1/W .
FL-QKD has three principal steps. First, Alice sends a
low-brightness (photons per mode 1) portion of her ASE
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FIG. 1. Schematic of FL-QKD under Eve’s optimum collective
attack realized as an SPDC-injection attack. Photons generated by
Alice’s broadband source are marked by thin dotted lines (black),
photons generated by Alice’s photon-pair source are marked by
thin solid lines (green), photons generated by Eve’s entanglement
source are marked by thin dashed lines (red), and photons emitted
by Bob’s amplifier are marked by thick lines (blue). The channel
monitoring apparatus consists of the three single-photon detectors
placed in red boxes. Note that at Bob’s single-photon detector only the
photons originating from Alice’s photon-pair source (solid line) are
coincident with Alice’s idler photons, whereas the photons injected
by Eve (dashed line) only contribute to the noise background. As
such, Eve’s injection ratio fE can be determined by measuring the
coincidences versus singles rates at Alice and Bob’s single-photon
detectors.
light to Bob, which is completely correlated with the high-
brightness (photons per mode  1) remainder that she retains
for use as her homodyne receiver’s local oscillator (LO).
Low-brightness light cannot be amplified or cloned with good
fidelity, while the M  1 modes per bit duration permits
FL-QKD to mitigate loss in the Alice-to-Bob channel, so that
on average Bob receives at least one photon per bit duration.
Second, Bob uses binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) to encode
a bit sequence onto the light he received from Alice. He
then amplifies the modulated light with a high-gain amplifier
to overcome the return-path propagation loss while adding
spontaneous emission noise. Third, Alice receives the light
returned from Bob and decodes his bit sequence by broadband
homodyne reception after delaying her LO by that of the
Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice round trip.
An essential part of FL-QKD is Alice and Bob’s monitoring
of their quantum channel to defeat Eve’s optimum collective
attack [24]. Alice combines the low-brightness ASE light she is
sending to Bob with the signal output from a continuous-wave
(cw) spontaneous parametric down-converter (SPDC) and
taps a small fraction of the combined ASE-SPDC light for
coincidence detection with the SPDC’s idler output prior to
sending the rest of that light to Bob. Her singles and signal-idler
coincidence measurements tell her the SPDC fraction in
her combined ASE-SPDC light. Similarly, Bob taps a small
fraction of the light he receives for singles measurements
and for coincidence measurements with Alice’s idler that
tell him the fraction of his received light which originated
from the SPDC. Bob’s tap measurements are normalized
relative to Alice’s tap measurements to yield fE , a parameter
that quantifies Eve’s intrusion on the Alice-to-Bob quantum
channel:
fE = 1 − (CIB − C˜IB)/SB(CIA − C˜IA)/SA
. (1)
Here, CIB (CIA) is the time-aligned coincidence rate of Bob’s
(Alice’s) tap, C˜IB (C˜IA) is the time-shifted coincidence rate
of Bob’s (Alice’s) tap that measures accidental coincidences,
and SB (SA) is the singles rate of Bob’s (Alice’s) tap. This fE
measurement is calibration free [24]; i.e., it is independent of
channel loss, detector efficiencies, and source brightness.
We emphasize that FL-QKD is fundamentally a multimode
protocol (M  1) that makes it feasible to achieve much
higher SKE and SKR than existing QKD protocols by utilizing
an ASE source whose optical bandwidth greatly exceeds the
modulation rate. Operationally, however, this large bandwidth
disparity does not require wavelength-division multiplexing,
as is the case in classical communication. Instead, a broadband
homodyne receiver whose electrical bandwidth equals the
modulation rate suffices. Moreover, Bob’s optical amplifier, at
the cost of a modest reduction in each mode’s signal-to-noise
ratio, compensates return-path loss and detector inefficiency.
It also adds noise such that high-efficiency, shot-noise limited
detection is not necessary, unlike the case for continuous-
variable QKD [3,11,12].
In Ref. [24] we showed that Eve’s optimum collective
attack is the SPDC-injection attack (see Appendix B) shown
in Fig. 1, for which fE equals the fraction of light entering
Bob’s terminal that came from Eve. The collective-attack
security analysis in Ref. [24] granted Eve all of the return
light and an optimum collective measurement for decoding
Bob’s bit sequence. A lower bound on Alice and Bob’s
information-rate advantage against the optimum collective
attack can be obtained via
RLBAB =
[
βIAB − χUBEB (fE)
]
R, (2)
where IAB is Alice and Bob’s Shannon information, β is
their reconciliation efficiency, and χUBEB (fE) is an upper bound
on Eve’s Holevo information when her injection fraction is
fE . In Eve’s passive attack (no light injection) [25], her
Holevo-information bound, χUBEB (0), can be determined prior
to communication. Then, because Alice decodes all the bits
sent by Bob, they can perform direct secure communication
by Bob’s using codes developed for wiretap channels to send
a message to Alice with semantic-security protection [32].
However, when Eve injects light into Bob (fE > 0), her
Holevo-information bound, χUBEB (fE), can only be determined
after channel monitoring. In this case, Alice and Bob can only
perform key distribution and Bob must therefore transmit a
random bit sequence.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
Figure 2 shows our experimental setup, which was designed
to realize two main goals: demonstrating high-SKR FL-QKD
operation, and confirming the feasibility of coincidence-based
measurement of Eve’s injection fraction, fE , down to values
such that the upper bound on her Holevo information rate
is severely restricted. Using our existing equipment we
chose a moderate modulation rate of 100 Mbit/s, with the
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FIG. 2. FL-QKD’s experimental implementation. BPSK, binary phase-shift keying; CWDM, coarse wavelength-division multiplexer;
EDFA, erbium-doped fiber amplifier; Tap, beam splitter. Photon-pair source is a cw SPDC.
understanding that it can be easily scaled to ∼10 Gbit/s rates
with commercially available components.
Alice uses an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) fol-
lowed by an 18-nm (W = 2.2 THz) optical filter centered at
1550 nm to produce broadband ASE light. A low-brightness
portion of the ASE is tapped for transmission to Bob, while
the remainder is stored in a fiber delay loop to serve as the
LO for homodyne reception in the decoding step. The SPDC
light is generated in a MgO-doped periodically poled lithium
niobate (PPLN) crystal cw-pumped at 780 nm. The idler arm
is detected by a WSi superconducting nanowire single-photon
detector (SNSPD) immediately after its production. The signal
arm of the SPDC, serving as the channel-monitor probe,
is mixed with the ASE light using a 98:2 beam splitter.
Before Alice sends the ASE-SPDC light to Bob, she taps and
directs a small portion (< 0.1%) of it to a WSi SNSPD for
coincidence measurement with the idler. We insert a 10-dB
optical attenuator in the Alice-to-Bob channel to simulate the
channel loss of a 50-km fiber link. Upon receiving the signal,
Bob encodes messages using a phase modulator that takes
the pseudorandom data generated from a bit-error rate (BER)
tester and imparts a 100-Mbit/s BPSK modulation. He then
taps and sends a small portion (< 0.1%) of the modulated
light to a WSi SNSPD for coincidence measurement with the
idler. An EDFA amplifies the rest of the signal and masks
it with strong ASE noise. At Alice’s receiver, she combines
the returned signal and her stored and delay-matched LO
to perform a broadband homodyne measurement to retrieve
Bob’s message (see Appendix A for more details).
To estimate Alice and Bob’s Shannon information, BER
measurements were taken at different source brightness levels,
as plotted in Fig. 3, showing good agreement between theory
and experiment. At all values of Alice’s transmitted source
brightness NS = PPB/WT , where PPB is her mean number of
transmitted photons per bit duration, Alice’s BER is far below
the quantum Chernoff bound on Eve’s BER for her optimum
passive individual attack [25]. The BER deviates from theory at
a level of ∼1×10−5, which could be owing to the phase-locked
loop in our measurement setup being less stable at higher input
powers, as indicated by an observed higher number of polarity
flips (each of which would cause a bit error). We suspect that
the higher servo-loop gain due to the increased input power at
the same electronic-signal gain setting could be responsible.
However, such a BER deviation from theory has no effect on
the SKRs. The inset of Fig. 3 overlays 50 bits of the homodyne
receiver’s real-time output on Bob’s scaled modulated message
waveform, showing high signal-to-noise ratio for message
decoding. Note that the homodyne measurement noise was
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FIG. 3. Alice’s BER versus her mean number of transmitted
photons per bit duration for W = 2.2 THz source bandwidth and
R = 100 Mbit/s modulation over a channel with 10 dB loss. Red
circles: measured BER with error bars indicating ±1 standard devi-
ation of 10 consecutive measurements. Solid (red) curve: predicted
BER, including all measured experimental imperfections (detailed
in Appendix B). Dashed (green) curve: quantum Chernoff bound
on Eve’s BER for her optimum passive individual attack. Inset: 50
bits of homodyne-receiver’s output (blue jagged curve) versus Bob’s
modulated waveform (red square wave) at a BER level of 1×10−4,
clearly showing the high signal-to-noise ratio of Alice’s receiver.
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FIG. 4. Photon-coincidence histogram of the channel monitor.
Top curve (blue), Alice’s tap; bottom curve (red), Bob’s tap without
Eve’s light injection; middle curve (green), Bob’s tap when Eve
injects all the light entering his terminal. Inset: Measurements of fE
(red markers) under Eve’s intrusion at different injection fractions
with error bars indicating ±1 standard deviation over ten 500-s
measurements, and measurement of fE (black marker) when there is
no actual injection with an error bar indicating ±1 standard deviation
over thirty 500-s measurements.
dominated by the ASE of Bob’s amplifier, which was ∼20 dB
above the shot-noise level.
We simulated Eve’s SPDC-injection attack by feeding
broadband light into Bob’s terminal via a beam splitter.
Figure 4 illustrates FL-QKD’s ability to detect intrusion
with coincidence-data histogram plots from Alice and Bob’s
monitors, both referenced to the arrival time of the idler
photons. Here, the histograms of Alice’s reference tap, Bob’s
tap without Eve’s light injection (fE = 0), and Bob’s tap with
Eve replacing Alice’s light with her own (fE = 1) correspond
to the top (blue), bottom (red), and middle (green) curves,
respectively. Note the absence of a coincidence peak for
Bob’s tap when fE = 1. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of Alice and Bob’s channel monitoring, we compare the
measured fE value, via Eq. (1), with Eve’s actual fE value,
as determined by direct power measurements of Alice’s and
Eve’s light entering Bob’s terminal. The inset in Fig. 4 shows
excellent agreement between the measured and actual fE
values.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SECRET-KEY RATES
To estimate the SKR, we turned off Eve’s injection and
measured fE = (0.07 ± 0.2)% from the channel monitors.
After adding one standard deviation of measurement uncer-
tainty (other confidence levels are in Appendix C), we use
f UBE = 0.27% as an upper bound on Eve’s injection fraction.
We evaluate Alice and Bob’s Shannon information from the
BER measurements, Eve’s Holevo-information upper bound
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FIG. 5. Information rates and efficiencies in megabits per second
(left axis) and bits per channel use (right axis) versus Alice’s mean
number of transmitted photons per bit duration. Solid top curve
(green), Alice and Bob’s Shannon information; solid middle curve
(blue), SKR against a passive Eve; solid bottom curve (gray), SKR
against the optimum collective attack; dashed top curve (brown),
upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information for the optimum collective
attack; dashed bottom curve (black), upper bound on Eve’s Holevo
information for a passive attack; horizontal solid line, ultimate limit
on SKE in bits per channel use for a 10-dB-loss channel for all
single-mode-per-channel-use one-way QKD protocols [9].
χUBE (f UBE ) for her optimum collective attack, and χUBE (0) for
her passive attack (see Appendix B). In this SKR estimation,
we assume a β = 94% reconciliation efficiency [33]. For
a passive attack with our 100 Mbit/s modulation rate, we
optimize Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per bit
and obtain a peak direct secure-communication efficiency of
0.66 bits per channel use, yielding a direct secure-
communication rate of 66 Mbit/s. Against Eve’s optimum
collective attack with the same 100 Mbit/s modulation rate,
we obtain a peak SKE of 0.55 bits per channel use, after
optimizing Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per
bit, giving rise to an SKR of 55 Mbit/s. This SKE exceeds the
ultimate limit for all one-way single-mode-per-channel-use
QKD protocols by 5.6 dB; see Fig. 5.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated high-
rate FL-QKD using classical-state broadband light augmented
by a photon-pair source for channel monitoring. Our exper-
iment’s 55 Mbit/s SKR over a 10-dB-loss channel in an
asymptotic regime is a ∼50-fold improvement over state-of-
the-art QKD for the same channel attenuation [4,5], and our
experiment’s SKE of 0.55 bits per channel use is a ∼500-fold
improvement over that state-of-the-art system’s efficiency. A
complete finite-size analysis, as done in Refs. [4,5], is part of
our future study, but we expect that FL-QKD’s high SKR
would allow it to approach the asymptotic limit in a few
minutes.
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While pursuing FL-QKD’s full security proof against
general coherent attacks, we have analyzed a class of such
attacks, including an intercept-and-resend attack [24], and
found FL-QKD secure owing to the number-phase uncertainty
principle (see Appendix B). From an experimental perspec-
tive, we expect to substantially boost FL-QKD’s throughput
by increasing the modulation rate, optimizing the source
brightness, and employing faster NbN SNSPDs to reduce the
integration time needed for channel monitoring. Additionally,
we plan to implement FL-QKD with installed fibers and
dispersion compensation, which we have already done in
the current experiment using dispersion-compensating com-
ponents. With these future developments, FL-QKD points to a
viable route to long-distance gigabit-per-second communica-
tion systems with certifiable security. FL-QKD, like prevailing
QKD protocols, only allows point-to-point communication,
so that extending the protocol to enable secure commu-
nication between distributed users in a network would be
intriguing.
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
A detailed block diagram of our FL-QKD experimental
setup is shown in Fig. 6. In the experiment, the SPDC is
a nondegenerate type-0 phase-matched, MgO-doped, PPLN
crystal that is continuous-wave pumped at 780 nm with its
output coupled into a single-mode fiber. A CWDM separates
the SPDC signal and idler into two flat-top 18-nm-wide
channels centered at 1550 and 1570 nm, respectively. The
idler is detected immediately by a WSi SNSPD with ∼80%
detection efficiency and a counting rate of ∼2×106 counts
per second in an unsaturated regime. The SPDC signal is
used as a probe for quantifying Eve’s active intrusion. The
ASE noise produced by an EDFA is filtered by a CWDM,
whose 18-nm-wide 1550 nm output channel provides the
classical broadband light. The classical broadband light is
split by a 99:1 beam splitter: the 99% output serves as the
LO for Alice’s homodyne receiver to be stored in a fiber spool
situated inside Alice’s terminal, and the 1% output is further
attenuated by a tunable optical attenuator for transmission to
Bob.
The amplitude and phase of the ASE light for transmission
are fine-tuned using a WaveShaper (Finisar 1000S) that
offers two functionalities. First, the WaveShaper introduces
a wavelength-dependent loss on the ASE light to render its
spectrum indistinguishable from the spectrum of the SPDC
signal. Matching their spectra is critical for the security of
the protocol. Second, the WaveShaper applies a wavelength-
dependent phase shift on the ASE light to fine-tune its
dispersion property. In the experiment we find that the
WaveShaper is particularly useful for compensating high-order
φ
FIG. 6. Experimental schematic. Attn, attenuator; BERT, bit-error rate tester; BPSK, binary phase-shift keying; Coinc, coincidence counting;
CWDM, coarse wavelength-division multiplexer; EDFA, erbium-doped fiber amplifier; LO, local oscillator; PPLN, periodically poled lithium
niobate; SNSPD, superconducting nanowire single-photon detector; SPDC, spontaneous parametric down-converter.
012332-5
ZHANG, ZHUANG, WONG, AND SHAPIRO PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 012332 (2017)
dispersion. The wave-shaped ASE light is combined with the
SPDC signal on a 98:2 beam splitter: 98% of the SPDC signal
and 2% of the wave-shaped ASE light are sent to Bob. For
Alice’s reference tap, this combined ASE-SPDC light is tapped
(<0.1%, limited by the dead time of the SNSPDs) for detection
with a second WSi SNSPD, and the rest of the ASE-SPDC
light is sent to Bob. To simulate the channel loss induced by
a 50-km fiber link, we insert a 10-dB optical attenuator in the
Alice-to-Bob channel. In the experiment, the tunable optical
attenuator is used to adjust the mean number of transmitted
ASE photons per bit. At the operating point of ∼200 ASE
photons per bit, the SPDC signal constitutes <0.05% of the
combined transmitted ASE-SPDC light.
At Bob’s terminal, we first encode the pseudorandom bit
stream from a bit-error-rate tester (BERT) on the CWDM-
filtered light as BPSK using a 100-Mbit/s phase modulator.
The polarizer embedded in the phase modulator blocks light
in the unwanted polarization to avoid Eve’s taking advantage
of the unused polarization mode. To monitor the channel,
a small portion (<0.1%, limited by SNSPD dead time) is
tapped and detected by a WSi SNSPD. We then employ a
circulator to block all back-propagating light, followed by a
CWDM to reject all out-of-band light. We use an EDFA with a
measured ∼7-dB weak-input noise figure to amplify and mask
the encoded message. A CWDM is installed after the EDFA
to reject all out-of-band ASE noise.
At Alice’s receiver, we build a free-space tunable delay
line to match the propagation delays incurred by the LO and
the light that has undergone the Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice round
trip. To compensate the dispersion in the fiber link, we pass
the LO through ∼3 m of dispersion-compensating fiber. The
delay-matched LO and returned signal are mixed on a 50:50
beam splitter prior to their input to a 75-MHz bandwidth
balanced receiver (Thorlabs PDB-420C). To compensate the
phase drift arising from thermal and mechanical fluctuations,
we implement a servo loop to lock the relative phase between
the LO and the returned signal. In the servo loop, a lock-in
amplifier outputs a 5-kHz sinusoidal dither that is superim-
posed on the BPSK modulation. At the balanced receiver,
the high-frequency (BPSK modulation rate) amplitude of the
output signal is rectified with a power splitter followed by
a radio-frequency double-balanced mixer and then fed back
to the lock-in amplifier to generate an error signal for the
dither. A proportional-integral-derivative controller processes
the output of the lock-in amplifier and generates a phase-
compensation signal to be added to Bob’s phase modulator.
The homodyne receiver’s output is electrically filtered and
then either directed to the BERT for BER measurement, or to
a wideband oscilloscope for waveform measurement.
To simulate Eve’s SPDC-injection attack, we add a 98:2
beam splitter (insertion loss included in κ) to the Alice-to-
Bob channel. We split off a small amount of ASE light from
the LO, introduce a time delay and optical attenuation, and
inject the broadband light into Bob’s terminal through the 2%
port of the beam splitter. In this way, Eve’s injected light has
the same spectrum as the light Alice sends to Bob, and a
sufficiently long time delay ensures that Eve’s injected light
and the ASE light Alice sends are not correlated at Bob’s
terminal.
APPENDIX B: SECURITY ANALYSIS
Detailed security analysis for FL-QKD has been presented
in Ref. [24]. Here, we outline the essential components of that
analysis. In both her passive and optimum collective attacks,
Eve replaces the lossy Alice-to-Bob fiber with lossless fiber
into which she has inserted a beam splitter, and, for analysis
purposes, she is granted all photons in the Bob-to-Alice
channel. In her passive attack, Eve captures all photons at
the output port of the beam splitter in the Alice-to-Bob
channel without injecting any light into that channel. In the
SPDC-injection realization of her optimum collective attack,
Eve produces quadrature-entangled light from a SPDC and
injects the SPDC signal through her input port of the beam
splitter in the Alice-to-Bob channel. We assume Eve has a
perfect quantum memory to store all captured photons as well
as her SPDC idler. At Eve’s receiver, she either decodes each
bit individually or performs a collective measurement on all
photons she possesses. In the individual attack, we use the
quantum Chernoff bound to quantify Eve’s optimal BER. Eve’s
capability in the collective attack is quantified by an upper
bound on her Holevo information.
In a passive individual attack, the quantum Chernoff bound
for Eve’s optimal discrimination strategy is given by
Pr(e)QCBE = 12 exp
[−4Mκ(1 − κ)(1 − κB)N2S ], (B1)
where κ is the transmissivity of the Alice-to-Bob channel, κB
is the device loss prior to the EDFA at Bob’s terminal, and NS
is Alice’s source brightness as measured at the beginning of
the Alice-to-Bob channel.
Our lower bound on Alice and Bob’s secret-key rate against
collective attacks is given by
RLBAB(fE) =
[
βIAB − χUBEB (fE)
]
R, (B2)
where R is Bob’s modulation rate. Our experiment used R =
100 Mbit/s, and our secret-key rate calculation assumes β =
0.94 [33]. In FL-QKD, Bob’s BPSK modulation leads to a
binary signal from Alice’s homodyne measurement, so that
IAB is directly determined by Alice’s bit-error rate Pr(e)homAlice:
IAB = 1 + Pr(e)homAlice log2
[
Pr(e)homAlice
]
+ [1 − Pr(e)homAlice] log2 [1 − Pr(e)homAlice]. (B3)
Alice’s theoretical BER is calculated using Eq. (D8) of
Ref. [24]’s Appendix D augmented by a parameter η < 1
that models experimental imperfections caused by residual
dispersion and electronic-filter mismatch, and κB < 1 that
models device losses in Bob’s terminal prior to his EDFA.
Furthermore, κS in Eq. (D8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendix D refers
to the channel transmissivity seen by Alice and Bob, i.e.,
Bob’s received photon flux divided by Alice’s transmitted
photon flux. To relate κS to the actual channel transmissivity κ
(determined by the loss induced by the optical attenuator), we
let κS in Eq. (D8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendix D be κ/(1 − fE)
and obtain
Pr(e)homAlice = Q(
√
2Mκη(1 − κB)NSGB/NB)
= Q(
√
2Mκη(1 − κB)NS/γ ), (B4)
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where
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
dt
e−t
2/2
√
2π
. (B5)
In Eq. (B4),NS is the source brightness, κ = 0.1 is the one-way
transmissivity, M = 2.2×104 is the number of modes per bit,
GB = 3.8×103 is the EDFA’s gain, NB = 9.7×103 photons
per s-Hz is the brightness of the EDFA’s ASE output, and η ∼
0.9 and κB = 0.71 are obtained by experimental calibration.
The EDFA’s noise figure 10 log10(γ ) + 3, where γ ≡ NB/GB ,
was measured to be ∼7 dB with a weak-signal input. The
source brightness is calculated using
NS = P
ω0W
, (B6)
where P is the measured signal power at the output of Alice’s
terminal, ω0 ≈ 1.28×10−19 J is the signal wavelength’s
photon energy, and W = M×R = 2.2 THz (18 nm) is the
signal bandwidth.
We next derive our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo in-
formation. We consider Eve’s optimum collective attack, in
which she employs a broadband SPDC source to produce
quadrature-entangled signal and idler beams and uses a beam
splitter to inject the signal light into Bob’s terminal. The spectra
of Alice’s signal and the signal arm of Eve’s SPDC source are
well matched, because any out-of-band photons are filtered out
by the CWDM that precedes Bob’s EDFA. Our upper bound
on Eve’s Holevo information rate is given by [24]
χUBEB (fE) = min
{
S
[
ρGaussE (fE)
]− 1
2
1∑
k=0
S
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
]
,1
}
.
(B7)
Here, ρ(k)E is Eve’s conditional density operator—given the
value, k, of Bob’s bit—for the light at her disposal. It is an
M-fold tensor product of zero-mean, three-mode Gaussian
states all with the same Wigner covariance matrix (k)E (fE);
ρGaussE (fE) is an M-fold tensor product of zero-mean, three-
mode Gaussian states all with the same Wigner covariance
matrix E(fE) =
∑1
k=0 
(k)
E (fE)/2; and S(·) denotes von
Neumann entropy.
Eve’s conditional von Neumann entropy satisfies
S
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
] = MS[ρ(k)E (fE)], (B8)
where ρ(k)E is a zero-mean, three-mode Gaussian state with
Wigner covariance function

(k)
E (fE) =
1
4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2N actAB(fE) + 1 0 −CactIA(fE) 0 (−1)kCactAB(fE) 0
0 2N actAB(fE) + 1 0 CactIA(fE) 0 (−1)kCactAB(fE)
−CactIA(fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 (−1)kCactIB(fE) 0
0 CactIA(fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 (−1)k+1CactIB(fE)
(−1)kCactAB(fE) 0 (−1)kCactIB(fE) 0 2N actBA(fE) + 1 0
0 (−1)kCactAB(fE) 0 (−1)k+1CactIB(fE) 0 2N actBA(fE) + 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
(B9)
where
N actAB(fE) =
〈
eˆ
(2)†
Im
eˆ
(2)
Im
〉 = (1 − κ)NS + κNE(fE), (B10)
CactIA(fE) =
〈
eˆ
(1)
Im
eˆ
(2)
Im
〉 = 2√κNE(fE)[NE(fE) + 1], (B11)
CactAB(fE) =
〈
eˆ
(2)†
Im
aˆBm
〉 = 2√GB(1 − κB)κ(1 − κ)[NS − NE(fE)], (B12)
CactIB(fE) =
〈
eˆ
(1)
Im
aˆBm
〉 = 2√GB(1 − κB)(1 − κ)NE(fE)[NE(fE) + 1], (B13)
N actBA(fE) =
〈
aˆ
†
Bm
aˆBm
〉 = GB(1 − κB)[κNS + (1 − κ)NE(fE)] + NB. (B14)
In the preceding expressions, N actAB(fE) is the brightness of the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-Bob channel; N actBA(fE) is the
brightness of the light in the Bob-to-Alice channel; NE(fE) is the brightness of Eve’s SPDC signal; CactAB(fE) is the quadrature
correlation between the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-Bob channel and the light in the Bob-to-Alice channel; CactIA(fE)
is the quadrature correlation between the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-Bob channel and her idler; and CactIB(fE) is the
quadrature correlation between the light in the Bob-to-Alice channel and Eve’s idler. Equations (B10)–(B14) are obtained using
the annihilation operators eˆ(1)Im , eˆ
(2)
Im
, and aˆBm defined in Eqs. (C58), (C59), and (A8) of Ref. [24]’s appendixes. The annihilation
operator eˆ(1)Im is associated with Eve’s mth locally stored idler mode, eˆ
(2)
Im
is associated with the mth mode Eve captures from the
Alice-to-Bob channel, and aˆBm is associated with the mth returned signal mode from Bob. Alice and Bob’s channel monitoring
provides a calibration-free measurement of Eve’s injection fraction fE [24], from which they can compute the brightness of
012332-7
ZHANG, ZHUANG, WONG, AND SHAPIRO PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 012332 (2017)
Eve’s SPDC signal light as follows:
NE(fE) = κNSfE(1 − κ)(1 − fE) . (B15)
Eve’s unconditional Wigner covariance matrix is 6M×6M block diagonal with 6×6 identical blocks given by
E(fE) =
1∑
k=0

(k)
E (fE)/2
= 1
4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2N actAB(fE) + 1 0 −CactIA(fE) 0 0 0
0 2N actAB(fE) + 1 0 CactIA(fE) 0 0
−CactIA(fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 0 0
0 CactIA(fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 2N actBA(fE) + 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 2N actBA(fE) + 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(B16)
With(k)E (fE) and E(fE) in hand, one can readily evaluate
S[ρGaussE (fE)] and S[ρ(k)E (fE)] using symplectic decomposition
[34].
FL-QKD’s security analysis has so far been established
against collective attacks in which Eve interacts individually
with each frequency mode but is allowed to perform an
optimum joint measurement over all modes. A full security
proof against general coherent attack is under development,
but this does not preclude us from analyzing FL-QKD’s
security against specific coherent attacks, one of which is
the intercept-and-resend (I&R) attack. In such an attack, Eve
measures the timing of each photon from Alice and endeavors
to elude the channel monitor by producing a quantum signal
that mimics the measured photon statistics. In doing so, Eve
interacts coherently with all frequency modes. I&R attacks
have been given an appreciable amount of consideration
in Ref. [24], and here let us formulate the following I&R
attack. Eve first takes the light from Alice, performs a
quantum nondemolition (QND) photon-number measurement
on every temporal mode, and stores the output light from that
measurement for use as a reference. To elude the channel
monitor, Eve needs to ensure that (1) she sends a vacuum state
|0〉 into Bob’s terminal when the measured temporal mode
contains no photon and (2) she sends the Fock state |1〉 into
Bob’s terminal when the measured temporal mode contains a
photon. This is Eve’s only strategy to stay undetected because
violation of the former increases the time-shifted coincidence
rate C˜IB while violation of the latter reduces the time-aligned
coincidence rate CIB , either of which leads to fE 
= 0 being
measured. At this juncture, let us consider the amount of
information Eve can acquire in either case. In the former case,
a vacuum mode obviously carries no information. In the latter
case, |1〉’s phase is completely undefined because its photon
number is well defined—a consequence of the number-phase
uncertainty principle [35]. In other words, phase modulation
on |1〉 leaves the state unchanged, viz., eiθ |1〉 = |1〉 insofar
as any measurement on that state is concerned. Therefore,
there does not exist a phase reference for |1〉 that allows
for effective decoding of Bob’s phase modulation. We thus
conclude that the I&R attack offers Eve no information.
The above argument is consistent with FL-QKD’s security
analysis [24], which proves that fE = 0 indicates Eve’s
gaining no information in her active attacks. Going one
step forward, let us analyze how the I&R attack affects
Alice’s BER. First note that Eve’s QND timing measurements
destroy the phase coherence between her retained photons
and Alice’s local oscillator. In addition, we learned that Eve
is unable to decode Bob’s phase modulation. Consequently,
Eve’s encoding on the retained photons yields a 50% BER
at Alice’s terminal, leaving her I&R attack immediately
detectable.
APPENDIX C: SECRET-KEY RATES AT DIFFERENT
CONFIDENCE LEVELS
In the article, the reported SKR of 55 Mbit/s is obtained
by assuming that Eve’s injection fraction equals f UBE , the
experimentally determined injection fraction fE plus one
measurement standard deviation (σ ). SKRs at higher con-
fidence levels, i.e., adding more standard deviations to the
experimental fE value, can also be derived. A key feature
of FL-QKD is that its SKR can be optimized over source
brightness. So, we optimize SKR over source brightness at
2σ , 3σ , 4σ , and 5σ confidence levels and obtain the results in
Table I. It is notable that the SKRs at higher confidence levels
do not degrade much by virtue of the optimization.
TABLE I. SKRs at various confidence levels.
Confidence level Secret-key rate (Mbit/s)
1σ 55
2σ 49
3σ 43
4σ 38
5σ 34
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